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SUMMARY
This paper uses a unique data set on individual voting decisions to shed new light on
gender gaps in policy making. Our analysis focuses on Switzerland, the world leader
in direct democracy, where all citizens directly decide on a broad range of policies at
the ballot box. Analysing all federal votes held between 1981 and 2003, we show
that there are large gender gaps in the areas of health, environmental protection, de-
fence spending and welfare policy. The gender gaps typically persist even conditional
on socio-economic characteristics. We also ﬁnd that female policy-makers have a
substantial effect on the composition of public spending, but a small effect on the
overall size of government.
JEL codes: J16, J18, H51, H52, H53
—Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann
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1. INTRODUCTION
An old claim states that if women ruled the world, it would be a better place. Apart
from rare evidence from certain matrilineal and patriarchal societies (Andersen et al.,
2008; Gneezy et al., 2009), the substance of this claim is difficult to assess.
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One reason is that women are under-represented in most legislatures around the
world (see e.g. Norris and Krook, 2011 for evidence). On average, only one in five mem-
bers of national parliaments is a woman. The situation is even more dismal at the top of
national governments: only 20 out of 180 of the world’s 180 heads of state are women
(The Economist, 2012). As a result, women’s voices are more likely to go unheard than
those of men.
In response, gender quotas have been increasingly debated in the public and among
politicians as a means to raise the share of women among policy-makers (for example,
Norris and Krook, 2011). A few countries in Europe have indeed implemented gender
quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections: Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia,
Greece and France, for examples (see the Global Database of Quotas for Women at
http://www.quotaproject.org). And a number of European countries have adopted vol-
untary quotas for women in selected political parties (for example, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Hungary or the Czech Republic).
While quotas have improved female representation (see De Paola et al., 2010, for Italy;
Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2012, for Spain), little is known today whether quotas have
any effects on policy making (one exception being Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).
Taking a step back from the debate about gender quotas and why women are still un-
der-represented in politics, the broader question arises whether and where women and
men prefer different policies. The more aligned women and men’s preferences in a spe-
cific area, the smaller the expected effect from legal intervention. While preferences ex-
pressed in surveys such as the Eurobarometer or the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) are informative to a certain degree, the major drawback is that sur-
vey respondents have little incentive to think hard about the questions at hand, as there
are no real consequences involved (e.g. Brunner et al., 2011).
This article analyses gender gaps for policies in a setting where every citizen can di-
rectly decide on specific issues. The context is Switzerland, one of the oldest democracies
in the world. Swiss citizens make political decisions at the ballot on a broad range of pol-
icy issues. Citizens decide on a number of ballots up to four times each year, which
makes Switzerland the world leader in the use of direct democracy. Over the last 50
years, more than 300 ballots votes have been held at the federal level alone. In this con-
text of direct democracy, every citizen acts as a policy-maker, even though the final im-
pact is arguably much smaller compared to a parliamentary member in a representative
democracy.
The participation of Swiss women in policy making is a more recent phenomenon. At
the federal level, women have had the right to vote in federal elections and ballots only
since 1971. The representation of women in the Swiss federal parliament has grown
from 5% in 1971 to 30% since 2011. We start analysing data from 1981 onwards, when
women have had the right to vote for at least ten years.
In our setting, citizens vote on specific projects with real political and financial conse-
quences. Citizens have long experience in voting on ballot proposals as there is a long
tradition of direct democratic participation at the state and local level as well.
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Furthermore, each citizen receives detailed information about each ballot (including the
implied fiscal consequences if a ballot is approved) by mail before the vote.
Incentives for strategic behaviour are basically absent as a ballot requires a simple
‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. We can therefore identify gender differences in policy preferences as
revealed at the ballot box. Our preference measures have two main advantages over sur-
vey questions on desired policies (as asked in the Eurobarometer, for example). First, cit-
izens make a policy-relevant choice, and therefore are more likely to acquire
information on the topic. Second, ballot votes (if approved) involve taxpayers’ money,
and the documents distributed prior to the vote clearly indicate the implied fiscal conse-
quences. Therefore, our data allow us to study whether gender gaps persist even if that
involves an increase in federal expenditures.
Many of the ballot proposals we study, like social policies or environmental protec-
tion, are currently hotly debated in advanced democracies. Governments in many coun-
tries with aging populations, for example, consider an increase in the retirement age.
We find that women are much less sympathetic towards such policies.
Further, women show consistently higher approval rates for allocating funds to envi-
ronmental protection than men. At the same time, women are less supportive of nuclear
energy. We also find that women are more in favour of a healthy life style, for equal
rights for men and women, for support of the disabled but against the military. In sum,
we find that women clearly prefer different policies than men. Since we control for the
most important socio-demographic characteristics (such as age, education or income),
gender differences in these variables are not driving our results.1
The data for our analysis come from surveys which are held shortly after the federal
ballots. Starting in 1981, representative samples of roughly 1,000 eligible voters are
asked whether, and if so, how they voted. Unlike other surveys, survey accuracy is per-
fectly measurable in our case, as we observe stated approval in the surveys and actual
approval from official ballot statistics. We show that biases in our surveys are unlikely to
cause the gender gaps we find. In addition, the survey also collects a broad range of
socio-economic characteristics, which allows us to compare women and men with a simi-
lar socio-demographic background.
The data also allow us to investigate the financial consequences of women’s political
choices. To do so, we restrict the analysis to the sample of federal votes that would have
raised government spending, taxes or debt–if approved. Overall, we find that women
are only modestly more inclined to approve projects that increase the size of govern-
ment. Compared to men, they were 2.5 percentage points more likely to approve costly
policy proposals. More importantly, women prefer a very different composition of
1 If gender gaps were determined by income differences alone, women and men should vote similarly con-
ditional on financial well-being. If non-economic factors such as values, attitudes and beliefs, matter and
differ between men and women, gender gaps persist even when socio-economic characteristics are kept
constant (see e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; and Alesina and
Giuliano, 2011).
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government expenditures than men. Women were 10 percentage points more likely to
support spending for protection of the environment and 6 percentage points less likely
to support military spending.
The most immediate lesson that we can learn from our analysis is that women acting
as voters at the polls, deciding on actual policy proposals with financial consequences,
choose different policies than men. Though representatives in parliament are con-
strained by other considerations like party pressure or log-rolling as well, our evidence
on gender gaps absent strategic considerations suggests that gender quotas–by lifting the
share of women in politics–could lead to better representation of female preferences in
certain policy areas like the environment or spending on the military.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our article to the pre-
vious literature in economics and political science. Section 3 introduces the Swiss politi-
cal context and describes our data. Section 4 analyses the gender gaps in voting and
Section 5 sheds light on the fiscal consequences of female policy-makers. Conclusions
are presented in Section 6.
2. RELATION TO LITERATURE ON WOMEN IN POLICY MAKING
Our article is related to several literatures in economics and political science. First, our
study enhances our understanding of gender gaps in preferences. By studying individual
voting decisions on all relevant policy areas of an advanced democracy, our study is
complementary to experimental evidence (see the survey by Croson and Gneezy, 2009)
or studies based on hypothetical questions in surveys (e.g. Bertrand, 2010 for a compre-
hensive survey of the literature). One advantage of our direct democratic setting is that
we can elicit gender gaps as revealed at the ballot box. Some of our evidence is also in
line with earlier studies, for example, that women are more supportive of redistributive
policies (e.g. for the disabled) than men (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Luttmer and
Singhal, 2011).
Second, our article relates to research in political science on the electoral gender gap
(see e.g. Edlund and Pande, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Norris,
2005). Here, the focus is on party votes and the characterization of gender gaps along a
single, right-left dimension. We add to this literature by analysing gender gaps on a vari-
ety of issues. Other studies have tried to elicit gender gaps in policy preferences from
opinion polls like the General Social Survey, the Gallup or National Election Surveys
(see e.g. Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Mueller, 1988).2 While these studies are
2 A comparable data source for Europe is the Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey in the EU Member
States. There are, however, few surveys that directly ask for allocation of governmental resources. Only
in the survey of March/April 1984, 17 questions were asked whether government spending is too little/
about right/too much in a certain policy area. The questions, however, do not discuss how the money
would be actually spent or how the additional spending would be financed.
146 PATRICIA FUNK AND CHRISTINA GATHMANN
suggestive, the questions asked are often fairly general and typically do not involve deci-
sions about concrete projects and how they would be financed.
We compare the gender gaps in our ballot propositions to gender gaps in survey ques-
tions on public spending in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), whose
questions are the most comparable to our ballots. There respondents were asked
whether they would like to spend much more, more, not more nor less, less or much less
on several policy areas (the environment, military, health, etc.). We find few and statisti-
cally weak gender gaps in the ISSP data. We conclude from this comparison that it is
difficult to elicit actual policy preferences from stated attitudes to very general questions
which likely introduce substantial measurement error into the analysis. In addition, sur-
vey questions do not specify the specific fiscal costs of a different policy. In our direct
democratic setting in Switzerland, however, citizens face very concrete proposals with
real consequences, and consider the direct implications for the tax bill as well.
Third, our paper is relevant for the literature on female policy-makers. So far, most
causal evidence on the impact of female policy-makers is available for India, where
women are found to affect policies according to their preferences (Chattopadhyay and
Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; 2012). Based on imposed mandates for female village
leaders in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), for example, show that women allo-
cate resources to projects supporting women’s needs, e.g. public investments in fresh
drinking water.
For the developed world, Rehavi (2007) finds that increasing representation of
women in the United States led to a modest increase in health and correction institution
spending. In contrast, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) and Ferreira and Gyourko
(2014) find no consistent effects of female mayors on local spending in Italy and the
United States, respectively.
These mixed results on the role of female policy-makers in mature democracies beg
for an explanation. One reason could be that politicians are bound by party discipline,
or that post-electoral bargaining makes gender gaps disappear.3 A second explanation
could be that policy preferences between men and women do not differ even in the vot-
ing population as a whole. This paper casts doubts on the second explanation, as we
find sizeable gender differences in preferences for a variety of policy areas. Therefore,
the lack of impact of female policy-makers in certain settings is unlikely to be caused by
similar preferences in the voting population at large. Rather, it may be related to the
competitive selection process of policy-makers, and/or the limited power after election,
e.g. due to party pressure.
3 In theory, electoral competition may also diminish gender differences if politicians simply represent the
preferences of the median voter. Recent empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on the Downsian view
of the political process (e.g. Levitt, 1996; Lee et al., 2004; Washington, 2008; Svaleryd, 2009). The evi-
dence seems to be more consistent with a framework where candidates cannot fully commit to an elec-
toral platform (Alesina, 1988, Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997).
GENDER GAPS IN POLICY MAKING 147
Finally, we shed light on the debate whether political involvement of women
increases the size of government. While for the United States, women’s suffrage
might have increased state level spending (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008, reports
an insignificant estimate), results for Europe are mixed (Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt
and Dallal, 2008; Bertocchi, 2011). In contrast to these aggregate studies, we rely on
individual data on actual policy choices. Our results support the view that inclusion of
female preferences in the political decision-making process has small effects on total
spending.
3. DATAON VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN FEDERAL PROPOSITIONS
To analyse differences in policy choices between men and women, we make use of
the fact that Switzerland has wide-ranging possibilities for direct democratic participa-
tion. We focus in this study on the political decisions of citizens at the federal level.
National-level policies span a broad range of political decisions including important de-
cisions on the military and foreign policy which can typically not be studied using state-
level data.
In Switzerland, citizens can propose an initiative for a partial or total revision of the
federal constitution. If 50,000 signatures are collected, citizens can also request a refer-
endum about each law proposed by the federal government. Furthermore, a referen-
dum is mandatory for any changes to the constitution and all international treaties
Switzerland wants to ratify. As a consequence, citizens vote on federal ballots several
times each year.
In Switzerland, every person older than 18 years is allowed to vote (before March
1991, the minimum age was 20 years). No registration is necessary, and every eligible
person automatically receives the official documents to vote which include detailed in-
formation on the ballot to be decided. Specifically, the information package of the fed-
eral government contains the arguments for and against the proposition, a printed
version of the parliamentary debate (if any) and often outside opinions by interest
groups. Most importantly, the distributed documents contain the estimated financial
consequences, i.e. whether and by how much expenditures or taxes would increase if the
proposition was approved.
Hence, Swiss citizens have easy access to information about the ballots both through
the distributed documents and discussions in the media. In our data, 78% of voters re-
port that they were well informed about the ballot prior to the vote. Furthermore, they
have practiced their direct democratic participation rights for more than a century at
the federal level and even longer in many states (cantons). We therefore believe that the
electorate is able to make informed choices about the proposed ballots.
The data we use for our analysis of federal ballots are taken from the VOX surveys,
which are conducted by telephone shortly after each vote (for more information on the
data source, see http://www.gfsbern.ch). Overall, we have data for 185 of the 202 fed-
eral propositions held between 1981 and 2003.
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The survey collects data on voting behaviour for a representative sample of 1,000 (be-
fore 1987, 700) Swiss citizens. The survey asks about the voting decision in the last fed-
eral ballot and whether the respondent was informed about the propositions. It also
collects information on general political attitudes and party preferences as well as the re-
spondent’s demographic and economic situation.
Since we are interested in comparing choices of female and male voters, we drop all re-
spondents under the age of 20 years, who were not eligible to vote until March of 1991,
and under 18 years thereafter. Even though earlier surveys also ask non-voters about their
preferred voting outcome, we focus in the main analysis on actual voters. Arguably, the
politically active population is the most relevant for understanding the consequences if
more women enter politics, especially in countries other than Switzerland. In the
Appendix, we show that gender gaps are similar for the broader sample of Swiss citizens.
Our data have a number of advantages over previously employed surveys: first, we
use information on voting behaviour with real political and financial consequences. Since
every eligible voter receives detailed information about these consequences before each
vote, we consider the voting decisions as a more reliable indicator of policy preferences
than hypothetical questions from opinion polls. In addition, the policy choices are repre-
sentative for the electorate as a whole since individuals in all cantons vote on the same
proposition. Second, the votes cover a wide range of political issues, such as health pol-
icy, changes in unemployment insurance, new environmental policies, subsidies for agri-
culture or membership in international organizations. While the set of issues decided at
the ballot box does not coincide with the set of decisions taken by members of parlia-
ment, the political choices are often very similar.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of our full sample separately for men and women
over the period from 1981 to 2003. With the exception of household income and num-
ber of children, all variables are available for the full 185 votes.
Table 1 reflects the more traditional position of women in Swiss society: women are
on average less educated than men and have lower income available to them. The fe-
male labour force participation rate is low compared to the United States as is the frac-
tion of divorced people. Women in the sample are also more likely to live in urban areas
and in the French- and Italian-speaking cantons of Switzerland.
Finally, female turnout at the ballot box is also slightly lower than for men. Over the
whole sample, male turnout is 63%, and female turnout is 55%. The gender gap in
turnout seems to be slightly decreasing over time.
To gauge the representativeness of the survey, we also compare demographic charac-
teristics of survey participants to the general population in the Swiss Population Census
between 1980 and 2000 (shown on the right-hand side of Table 1). Male survey respon-
dents are slightly more skilled and less likely to be employed than in the Census data.
Among women, survey respondents are somewhat younger, more high-skilled and more
likely to be employed than in the general population. Since we control for demographic
characteristics in all our estimations, this overrepresentation of certain socio-economic
groups should not be a major concern.
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4. GENDER GAPS AT THE BALLOT BOX
We first show the votes with the largest gender differences in approval in the 185 votes
held between 1981 and 2003 in Table 2. The Appendix briefly describes the main goals
and fiscal implications of the ten votes.
Table 1. Summary statistics
VOX data Population census
Women Men Women Men
Mean Std.
Dev
Mean Std.
Dev
Mean Std.
Dev
Mean Std.
Dev
Demographics
Age 20–39 years 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49
Age 40–59 years 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48
Age 60þ years 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.44
Protestant 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50
Have kids 0.40 0.49 0.32 0.46
Single 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.28 0.45
Married 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.64 0.48
Divorced 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22
Education, work and income
Compulsory education 0.24 0.43 0.11 0.32 0.36 0.48 0.19 0.39
Apprentice/spec schools 0.70 0.46 0.77 0.42 0.55 0.50 0.68 0.47
University education 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.28
Employed 0.52 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.75 0.43
Income 1.90 1.40 2.40 1.49
House ownership 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50
Region of residence
Urban 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.46
French-/Italian-speaking
canton
0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.44
Knowledge vote
Well-informed about vote 0.74 0.44 0.82 0.38
Political participation
Turnout: 1981–2003 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.48
Turnout 80s (1984–1993) 0.55 0.50 0.65 0.48
Turnout 90s (1994–2003) 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49
Observations 88,289 85,479 342,466 298,149
Notes: The left-hand side of the table reports summary statistics of the VOX survey data for all adults aged 20
years and above between 1981 and 2003. Protestant and whether the respondent has children are both binary
indicators. Single, married and divorced are binary indicators describing the civil status of the respondent.
Educational attainment is measured as binary outcomes whether a respondent has compulsory schooling degree,
some vocational training or a tertiary degree. Employment is a binary indicator equal to one if the person is em-
ployed and zero if she is non- or unemployed. Income measures household income in ﬁve income classes. House
ownership is a binary variable equal to one if the household owns a house and zero otherwise. Well informed is
equal to 1 if the respondent could correctly answer questions about the respective ballot. Both urban residence
and the dominant language in the canton of residence are binary indicators. The right-hand side shows the char-
acteristics of the Census population in 1980, 1990 and 2000. Variables are deﬁned as closely to the deﬁnition in
the VOX data but some discrepancies might result because the deﬁnitions do not coincide (for example, for em-
ployment status).
Source: VOX surveys, 1981–2003.
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Women were 18 percentage points more likely to support an initiative for a reduction
in tobacco consumption. More generally, women are much more supportive of votes to
promote a healthy lifestyle. Not surprisingly, women were also more likely to support
votes for the equal representation of women in the federal government and a reform of
marital law that stresses equal rights and responsibilities of husband and wife. In addi-
tion, women were more supportive of anti-discrimination policies, the protection of the
environment and government subsidies for the disabled. On the other hand, they op-
pose the use of nuclear energy.
On specific policies then, women voted quite differently than men. Is this result real
or just the consequence of non-response or reporting bias in the VOX surveys? If un-
truthful reporting or selective response (on the part of men, women, or both) was a prob-
lem, one should see a discrepancy between survey and real approval rates.4 In contrast
to other surveys, we can directly measure non-response or reporting bias by comparing
the average approval of voters in the survey with the official result of the ballot.
For seven votes shown in Table 2, the difference between stated approval in the sur-
vey and the official result is only 1.7 percentage points on average and statistically insig-
nificant. Three votes have a statistically different approval in the survey compared to the
ballot box. Citizen support in the survey is significantly higher compared to approval
rates at the ballot box in the two policy areas environmental protection and gender
equality (the difference is 7 percentage points for the vote ‘Protection of Rivers and
Lakes’, 10 percentage point for the vote ‘For a car free Sunday’ and 12 percentage point
for the vote ‘Change in marital law’). However, the gender gaps in preferences are
Table 2. Federal propositions with the largest gender gap
Title of proposition Vote
number
Year
of vote
Gender
gap (%)
Reduction of tobacco consumption 404 1993 17.7
Equal representation of women in
federal government
461 2000 17.5
Change in marital law 336 1985 17.0
Against racial discrimination 414 1994 16.8
Against subsidies for corn production 413 1994 15.6
Reduction of alcohol consumption 403 1993 15.5
For protection of rivers and lakes 381 1992 15.3
For a car-free Sunday per quarter 498 2003 14.9
For abandoning nuclear energy 365 1990 14.7
For equal rights of the disabled 500 2003 14.6
Notes: The second column reports the ofﬁcial number of the vote and the third column the year the vote was held.
The last column shows the gender gap, the percentage of women approving the proposition minus the percentage
of men. Positive numbers imply that women were more supportive of the proposition than men.
Source: VOX Surveys, 1981–2003, sample of voters.
4 Funk (2012) analyses in detail the survey bias of the VOX data. As it turns out, consistent survey biases
are concentrated in a few policy areas (immigration, international integration, rights for homosexual
couples).
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much larger than the survey bias, which strongly suggests that women indeed prefer dif-
ferent policies than men.
Table 2 is restricted to voters who have made actual choices at the ballot and are
therefore well informed about the subject at hand. Yet, we find very similar gender gaps
if we add non-voters to our sample (the VOX surveys also ask non-voters how they
would have voted in the ballot). There are two exceptions: for the votes directly related
to gender (change in marital law; equal rights of men and women), the gender
gaps among the voters are larger than for the average population (17% versus 7% and
14.5% versus 7%). The reason is a higher representation of more extreme prefer-
ences among female voters who voted in large enough numbers to generate a large
gender gap.
While suggestive, our summary statistics also show that women in the sample differ
along other observable dimensions from men, for example, they are more likely to live
in urban areas and have less income. To control for such possible confounding factors,
we now turn to a more systematic analysis of political gender gaps.
In what follows, we focus on 11 main policy areas: two areas are state affairs (interna-
tional relations and legal provisions on direct democracy and gender), four areas cover
public goods (environment, transportation, defence and culture), two cover the public
provision of a private good (education, health), and three areas are about transfers and
redistribution (agricultural subsidies, social security provisions and subsidies for housing).
To classify the federal ballot propositions into the 11 policy areas, we use the title and
description of the vote. We focus on policy areas that seemed interesting beyond the
Swiss setting and classified 87 (out of 185) votes. To make this selection as transparent as
possible, Appendix Table A1 lists all the 185 votes (title, gender gap and year of the
vote), together with information on whether the vote was falling into one of the eleven
policy areas or not. If classified, the table also shows the policy area it belongs to. As can
be seen from this Appendix table, there are nine votes on environmental protection
ranging from the introduction of car-free Sundays to subsidizing solar energy with gov-
ernmental funds.
Our statistical analysis then relates the support for more (or less) of a policy in a ballot
to the respondent’s gender, controlling for age, education, marital status, house owner-
ship, employment, religion and residential type (urban versus non-urban). Furthermore,
we include canton fixed effects (to control for the region of residence) and (ballot fixed
effects (to adjust for differences in the overall voter support for a ballot).
Table 3 reports the effects of gender on the voting decision in each policy area. As
can be seen from Table 3 first page, women are more immigration friendly than men,
are more likely to support projects protecting the environment, but are against nuclear
energy or the military. Women also have a 22 percentage point higher probability than
men to approve measures towards gender equality. From Table 3 second page, we can
see that there are gender differences in supporting a healthy life style (women are 16.3
percentage points more likely to approve measures targeting at reducing tobacco and al-
cohol consumption) and the use of gen-technology and animal testing. In the area of
152 PATRICIA FUNK AND CHRISTINA GATHMANN
T
ab
le
3.
V
ot
in
g
b
eh
av
io
u
r
of
m
en
an
d
w
om
en
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
af
fa
ir
s
M
il
it
ar
y
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t
T
ra
n
sp
or
t
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
L
eg
al
Pr
o
jo
in
in
g
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
A
ga
in
st
fo
re
ig
n
im
m
ig
ra
tio
n
Pr
o
fo
re
ig
n
im
m
ig
ra
tio
n
L
es
s
m
ili
ta
ry
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n
of
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
A
ga
in
st
nu
cl
ea
r
en
er
gy
A
ga
in
st
fu
rt
he
r
ro
ad
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
Pr
o
sp
ee
d
lim
its
A
ga
in
st
sp
ee
d
lim
its
A
ga
in
st
su
bs
id
ie
s
pa
rk
in
g
Pr
o
pu
bl
ic
tr
an
sp
or
t
A
ga
in
st
su
bs
id
ie
s
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
Pr
o
lib
er
al
iz
in
g
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
E
qu
al
ri
gh
ts
w
om
en
an
d
m
en
M
or
e
di
re
ct
de
m
oc
ra
cy
Fe
m
al
e
du
m
m
y
0.
01
20
0
.0
90
5*
**
0.
08
75
**
0.
04
94
**
0.
07
69
**
*
0.
10
7*
**
0.
02
94
0.
05
50
*
0
.0
67
0
0.
08
63
0.
00
16
9
0.
11
4*
**
0
.0
11
2
0.
22
0*
**
0.
03
37
(0
.0
21
1)
(0
.0
30
9)
(0
.0
42
0)
(0
.0
24
8)
(0
.0
15
8)
(0
.0
21
9)
(0
.0
24
0)
(0
.0
32
5)
(0
.0
49
5)
(0
.0
80
4)
(0
.0
27
6)
(0
.0
37
8)
(0
.0
27
4)
(0
.0
38
5)
(0
.0
29
5)
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
20
9*
**
0
.2
18
**
*
0.
36
1*
**
0.
12
5*
**
0.
12
9*
**
0.
06
27
*
0.
07
26
*
0.
09
05
*
0
.0
63
5
0.
17
4
0.
15
3*
**
0.
18
5*
**
0
.0
27
2
0.
11
4*
0
.0
33
4
(0
.0
33
6)
(0
.0
35
7)
(0
.0
25
7)
(0
.0
39
9)
(0
.0
24
3)
(0
.0
36
2)
(0
.0
40
1)
(0
.0
59
0)
(0
.0
79
7)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.0
38
9)
(0
.0
62
8)
(0
.0
43
7)
(0
.0
63
8)
(0
.0
42
4)
M
ar
ri
ed
0.
02
14
0
.0
12
8
0
.0
67
1
0
.0
21
1
0
.0
10
4
0
.0
16
4
0
.1
52
**
*
0.
00
94
3
0.
02
35
0
.1
54
*
0.
02
23
0
.0
23
0
0.
08
34
**
*
0
.0
24
7
0
.0
23
9
(0
.0
22
4)
(0
.0
34
6)
(0
.0
45
8)
(0
.0
26
8)
(0
.0
17
2)
(0
.0
23
8)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
33
3)
(0
.0
53
3)
(0
.0
92
8)
(0
.0
30
1)
(0
.0
43
1)
(0
.0
30
5)
(0
.0
42
5)
(0
.0
32
1)
H
ou
se
ow
ne
r
0
.0
07
25
0.
04
04
0
.0
05
45
0
.0
86
7*
**
0
.0
78
4*
**
0
.0
74
2*
**
0
.0
39
9*
0
.0
30
6
0.
08
13
0.
01
97
0
.0
62
2*
*
0.
02
94
0.
11
7*
**
0
.1
62
**
*
0.
04
81
(0
.0
22
1)
(0
.0
32
7)
(0
.0
45
3)
(0
.0
25
5)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
23
8)
(0
.0
23
5)
(0
.0
31
0)
(0
.0
54
2)
(0
.0
78
2)
(0
.0
28
4)
(0
.0
41
8)
(0
.0
28
2)
(0
.0
38
9)
(0
.0
30
2)
E
m
pl
oy
ed
0.
06
38
**
*
0.
00
80
1
0
.0
91
8*
*
0.
05
19
*
0
.0
37
1*
*
0.
02
44
0
.0
28
1
0.
02
30
0.
02
05
0.
07
49
0
.0
52
4
0
.0
54
0
0.
03
06
0.
01
52
0
.0
51
3
(0
.0
24
5)
(0
.0
37
3)
(0
.0
45
1)
(0
.0
30
2)
(0
.0
18
1)
(0
.0
25
2)
(0
.0
26
1)
(0
.0
33
7)
(0
.0
56
5)
(0
.0
96
7)
(0
.0
32
9)
(0
.0
42
2)
(0
.0
30
6)
(0
.0
44
8)
(0
.0
34
9)
A
ge
0
.0
01
33
*
0.
00
22
2*
*
0
.0
04
61
**
*
0
.0
05
17
**
*
0
.0
03
89
**
*
0
.0
03
66
**
*
0
.0
01
81
**
0
.0
00
84
2
0.
00
10
5
0.
00
30
2
0.
00
13
6
0.
00
12
1
0
.0
02
31
**
0
.0
00
60
7
0
.0
02
99
**
*
(0
.0
00
71
0)
(0
.0
01
13
)
(0
.0
01
42
)
(0
.0
00
88
9)
(0
.0
00
53
4)
(0
.0
00
74
5)
(0
.0
00
76
2)
(0
.0
01
02
)
(0
.0
01
70
)
(0
.0
02
74
)
(0
.0
00
95
0)
(0
.0
01
30
)
(0
.0
00
92
6)
(0
.0
01
26
)
(0
.0
01
01
)
Pr
ot
es
ta
nt
0.
00
49
9
0
.0
00
85
5
0.
03
60
0
.0
52
2*
*
0
.0
03
56
0
.0
47
1*
0
.0
06
79
0
.0
27
4
0.
00
93
8
0.
14
4*
0
.0
54
3*
0.
02
33
0.
08
32
**
*
0
.0
86
3*
*
0
.0
49
6
(0
.0
22
3)
(0
.0
33
2)
(0
.0
46
5)
(0
.0
26
1)
(0
.0
16
7)
(0
.0
24
1)
(0
.0
25
8)
(0
.0
33
1)
(0
.0
54
0)
(0
.0
82
7)
(0
.0
30
1)
(0
.0
44
6)
(0
.0
29
3)
(0
.0
39
6)
(0
.0
30
4)
N
um
be
r
of
ba
llo
ts
5
3
1
5
9
5
4
1
1
1
3
2
4
3
4
B
al
lo
tﬁ
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
an
to
n
ﬁx
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
83
3
1,
03
8
56
9
2,
08
9
4,
83
8
2,
37
7
1,
96
9
67
0
50
5
20
4
1,
47
2
68
8
1,
77
0
94
1
1,
54
8
L
og
-li
ke
lih
oo
d
1
61
7.
96
6
25
.6
0
3
09
.7
1
1
18
2.
49
2
88
0.
52
1
50
1.
85
1
15
4.
24
3
09
.6
0
3
19
.5
6
1
23
.2
3
8
99
.3
5
4
12
.3
3
1
02
0.
10
4
60
.2
6
8
04
.6
6
N
ot
es
:T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
m
ar
gi
na
le
ffe
ct
s
fr
om
a
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
th
e
vo
tin
g
de
ci
sio
n,
w
hi
ch
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
su
pp
or
te
d
th
e
pr
op
os
iti
on
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
ise
fo
r
th
e
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
pr
op
os
iti
on
s
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
co
l-
um
n
he
ad
er
.T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
co
ef
ﬁc
ie
nt
on
th
e
fe
m
al
e
du
m
m
y.
A
ll
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
ca
nt
on
an
d
ba
llo
tﬁ
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
co
nt
ro
lf
or
liv
in
g
in
ur
ba
n
re
gi
on
s(
>
10
,0
00
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s)
an
d
sp
ea
ki
ng
G
er
m
an
as
a
na
tiv
e
la
ng
ua
ge
(a
ll
co
nt
ro
ls
ex
ce
pt
ag
e
ar
e
bi
na
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s).
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
C
oe
fﬁ
ci
en
ts
w
ith
**
*
ar
e
sig
ni
ﬁc
an
ta
tt
he
1%
le
ve
l,
w
hi
le
th
os
e
w
ith
**
(*
)a
re
sig
ni
ﬁc
an
ta
tt
he
5%
(1
0%
)l
ev
el
.T
he
la
st
ro
w
re
po
rt
s
th
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
lo
g-
lik
el
ih
oo
d
fu
nc
tio
n.
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
.
GENDER GAPS IN POLICY MAKING 153
T
ab
le
3
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
).
V
ot
in
g
b
eh
av
io
u
r
of
m
en
an
d
w
om
en
H
ea
lt
h
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
W
el
fa
re
C
u
lt
u
re
an
d
L
ei
su
re
L
iv
in
g
Su
bs
id
ie
s
he
al
th
in
su
ra
nc
e
Pr
o
lib
er
al
iz
in
g
dr
ug
s
A
ga
in
st
to
ba
cc
o/
al
co
ho
l
A
ga
in
st
ge
n-
te
ch
/
an
im
al
te
st
.
Pr
o
le
ga
liz
e
ab
or
tio
n
C
he
ap
er
ho
sp
ita
ls/
ph
ar
m
a-
pr
od
.
Fr
ee
ed
uc
at
io
n
R
ed
uc
e
un
em
pl
.
be
ne
fit
s
D
ec
re
as
e
re
tir
em
en
t
ag
e
In
cr
ea
se
re
tir
em
en
t
ag
e
Su
pp
or
t
fo
r
th
e
di
sa
bl
ed
L
on
ge
r
m
at
er
ni
ty
le
av
e
M
or
e
cu
ltu
re
M
or
e
le
isu
re
Pr
o
ch
ea
p
ho
us
in
g
Fe
m
al
e
du
m
m
y
0.
03
8
0
.0
16
4
0.
16
3*
**
0.
08
25
**
*
0
.0
29
9
0
.0
38
8*
0.
00
85
0
.0
48
8
0.
05
29
**
*
0
.0
43
1
0.
13
7*
**
0.
05
13
*
0.
08
68
*
0.
01
02
0.
01
09
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
32
3)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
23
6)
(0
.0
40
9)
(0
.0
22
6)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
35
0)
(0
.0
20
6)
(0
.0
48
2)
(0
.0
47
4)
(0
.0
28
3)
(0
.0
44
5)
(0
.0
33
2)
(0
.0
45
8)
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
03
1
0.
11
9*
*
0.
14
0*
**
0
.0
15
0
0.
12
8*
*
0.
03
54
0.
05
71
0
.0
07
03
0.
13
7*
*
0.
02
08
0.
20
8*
**
0.
33
7*
**
0
.0
24
3
0
.0
38
8
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
49
4)
(0
.0
50
5)
(0
.0
35
2)
(0
.0
54
4)
(0
.0
38
1)
(0
.0
46
2)
(0
.0
32
0)
(0
.0
62
7)
(0
.0
69
1)
(0
.0
54
1)
(0
.0
42
8)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
65
1)
M
ar
ri
ed
0
.0
07
0
.0
57
8
0
.0
05
58
0
.0
32
1
0
.0
16
1
0.
00
80
8
0
.0
32
9
0
.0
56
4
0
.0
10
6
0
.0
61
1
0
.0
44
7
0
.0
43
0
0
.1
49
**
*
0.
01
22
0
.0
67
4
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
37
4)
(0
.0
27
6)
(0
.0
25
9)
(0
.0
44
6)
(0
.0
23
4)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
36
9)
(0
.0
22
6)
(0
.0
51
8)
(0
.0
53
1)
(0
.0
30
5)
(0
.0
47
0)
(0
.0
36
2)
(0
.0
50
6)
H
ou
se
ow
ne
r
0
.0
84
**
0.
00
82
8
0
.0
25
6
0
.0
33
5
0.
05
76
0
.0
34
5
0
.1
45
**
0.
07
30
**
0
.0
73
5*
**
0.
16
5*
**
0
.0
96
8*
0
.0
39
3
0.
07
39
0
.1
02
**
*
0
.2
93
**
*
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
34
6)
(0
.0
27
1)
(0
.0
24
6)
(0
.0
42
8)
(0
.0
22
1)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
34
7)
(0
.0
21
1)
(0
.0
48
7)
(0
.0
51
6)
(0
.0
29
0)
(0
.0
46
9)
(0
.0
34
4)
(0
.0
46
5)
E
m
pl
oy
ed
0
.0
16
0.
09
56
**
0.
00
08
51
0.
01
97
0.
16
6*
**
0.
02
43
0
.1
68
**
0.
02
36
0.
02
37
0
.1
28
**
0
.0
40
5
0
.0
17
6
0
.0
07
16
0.
09
17
**
0.
06
97
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
38
0)
(0
.0
28
1)
(0
.0
26
5)
(0
.0
47
3)
(0
.0
24
2)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
38
9)
(0
.0
24
1)
(0
.0
57
9)
(0
.0
55
7)
(0
.0
31
5)
(0
.0
49
3)
(0
.0
37
5)
(0
.0
50
9)
A
ge
0
.0
00
2
0
.0
03
85
**
*
0.
00
25
8*
**
0
.0
01
17
0
.0
00
87
4
9.
02
e-
05
0
.0
00
3
0.
00
39
4*
**
0
.0
02
24
**
*
0.
00
13
1
0
.0
00
91
8
0
.0
05
16
**
*
0
.0
03
34
**
0
.0
04
01
**
*
0.
00
13
6
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
20
)
(0
.0
00
77
0)
(0
.0
00
78
5)
(0
.0
01
35
)
(0
.0
00
74
0)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
12
)
(0
.0
00
74
4)
(0
.0
01
71
)
(0
.0
01
69
)
(0
.0
00
96
5)
(0
.0
01
49
)
(0
.0
01
09
)
(0
.0
01
54
)
Pr
ot
es
ta
nt
0.
00
6
0.
02
63
0
.0
24
8
0
.0
22
3
0.
16
9*
**
1
.7
4e
-0
5
0.
00
6
0.
06
13
*
0
.0
53
1*
*
0.
02
86
0
.0
84
8*
0
.0
73
0*
*
0
.0
51
6
0
.0
25
3
0
.0
35
2
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
35
3)
(0
.0
27
5)
(0
.0
25
1)
(0
.0
42
4)
(0
.0
22
9)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
36
5)
(0
.0
21
9)
(0
.0
50
6)
(0
.0
50
8)
(0
.0
29
1)
(0
.0
49
3)
(0
.0
35
4)
(0
.0
49
0)
N
um
be
r
of
ba
llo
ts
2
2
2
4
1
2
1
2
5
1
1
3
2
4
1
B
al
lo
tﬁ
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
an
to
n
ﬁx
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
94
9
1,
12
7
1,
11
2
2,
14
4
51
7
1,
10
7
25
1
95
2
2,
50
0
49
1
50
8
1,
45
0
55
6
1,
33
4
52
2
L
og
-li
ke
lih
oo
d
5
25
.8
0
6
68
.0
0
5
39
.1
1
1
30
2.
15
2
67
.4
9
4
49
.8
3
1
37
.4
3
5
07
.4
6
1
49
1.
13
2
98
.0
5
3
22
.9
1
8
47
.6
3
3
26
.3
0
 6
12
.7
6
2
97
.1
6
N
ot
es
:T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
m
ar
gi
na
le
ffe
ct
sf
ro
m
a
pr
ob
it
m
od
el
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
th
e
vo
tin
g
de
ci
sio
n,
w
hi
ch
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
su
pp
or
te
d
th
e
pr
op
os
iti
on
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
ise
fo
r
th
e
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
pr
op
os
iti
on
ss
ho
w
n
in
th
e
co
l-
um
n
he
ad
er
.T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
co
ef
ﬁc
ie
nt
on
th
e
fe
m
al
e
du
m
m
y.
A
ll
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
ca
nt
on
an
d
ba
llo
tﬁ
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
sa
nd
co
nt
ro
lf
or
liv
in
g
in
ur
ba
n
re
gi
on
s(
>
10
,0
00
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s)
an
d
sp
ea
ki
ng
G
er
m
an
as
a
na
tiv
e
la
ng
ua
ge
(a
ll
co
nt
ro
ls
ex
ce
pt
ag
e
ar
e
bi
na
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s).
C
on
tr
ol
s
fo
r
so
ci
o-
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
sa
re
in
cl
ud
ed
as
w
el
l(
al
lc
on
tr
ol
se
xc
ep
ta
ge
ar
e
bi
na
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s).
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
C
oe
fﬁ
ci
en
ts
w
ith
**
*
ar
e
sig
ni
ﬁc
an
ta
tt
he
1%
le
ve
l,
w
hi
le
th
os
e
w
ith
**
(*
)a
re
sig
ni
ﬁc
an
ta
tt
he
5%
(1
0%
)l
ev
el
.T
he
la
st
ro
w
re
po
rt
st
he
va
lu
e
of
th
e
lo
g-
lik
el
ih
oo
d
fu
nc
tio
n.
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
.
154 PATRICIA FUNK AND CHRISTINA GATHMANN
social security, women support a decrease in the retirement age more than men. Last,
women are relatively more supportive of the disabled and in favour of a longer mater-
nity leave. After listing the policies where women and men’s preferences differ, we also
would like to mention that no gender differences exist in policy areas such as transporta-
tion, direct democracy, education or the regulation of leisure.5
To what extent could these gender differences be driven by reporting bias? As shown
in Funk (2012), surveys are inaccurate especially in policy areas with a predominant po-
litically correct view (race and gender). For the votes on gender equality, it could there-
fore be that reporting and non-response bias potentially differ between women and men
and partly account for the observed gender differences in the survey. However, as can
be seen from Appendix Table A2, gender differences persist when restricting the sample
to the votes with no survey bias.6 Therefore, the gender gaps discovered in the areas of
environment, the military, healthy lifestyle or regarding the age of retirement seem to be
genuine preference differences between women and men. For the policies in the area of
immigration and support for the disabled, such a statement is more difficult as there are
no votes without survey bias. Nevertheless, there is no strong a priori reason as for why
biases in the area of immigration should differ across gender. Concerning the disabled,
it may be that women feel more pressured to appear caring due to underlying social
norms, and this may partly explain the gender gap in this vote.
We further explore whether women differ in their voting decisions along observable
characteristics. Do policy preferences of high-skilled women or women in the labour
force differ from the average woman? The results in Appendix Table A3 indeed suggest
some heterogeneity in policy preferences across education and labour force participa-
tion. In 10 out of the 26 votes, high-skilled women have different policy preferences
than the average woman. High-skilled women, for example, are more likely to oppose
restrictions against foreign immigration, more likely to support abortion and less likely
to support the liberalization of drugs. Policy preferences among women in the labour
force are different from the average woman for less than a quarter of the 26 votes.
Employed women, for example, are less in favour of increasing the retirement age, but
also more likely to oppose additional road construction or road subsidies than the aver-
age woman.
We then ask whether gender gaps are higher or lower among the high-skilled or those
employed. High-skilled women are more opposed to immigration restrictions and more
likely to support abortion than high-skilled men, whereas employed women are more
likely to vote against further road construction and parking subsidies than employed
5 One might also wonder whether gender gaps are influenced by women’s representation in the legisla-
ture. Interacting the female dummy with the share of female representatives in the parliament of the
canton of residence, we find few significant interaction effects.
6 A vote is not subject to survey bias if the null hypothesis ‘share yes’ among self-declared voters in the sur-
vey equal to official ‘share yes’ in the respective ballot cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
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men. Overall, the results suggest that employment and university education does reduce
some of the gender gaps but does by no means eliminate them.
So far, we have used house ownership as a proxy for income (as income is only avail-
able in the later votes). However, since women have lower income on average, this may
affect their preferences for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lott and Kenny,
1999), or potentially also their demand for environmental protection. Table 4 re-investi-
gates the estimated gender gaps, while controlling more rigorously for potential income
differences between women and men.
Table 4 first row re-restimates previous baseline regressions (underlying Table 3) for
the sample of votes where household income had been asked for in the surveys. Gender
gaps that are statistically significant (at the 5% level) in the baseline remain so when con-
trolling for income (with little change in the coefficient estimate). As such, income differ-
ences are certainly not the cause behind the observed gender gaps. Also, controlling
more rigorously for education (see third row) tends to increase the gender gaps we ob-
serve. The next specification includes a variable whether the voter felt well informed
about the ballot. The fourth row shows the baseline for the subset of votes for which the
variable is available, while the fifth row adds the variable as an additional control. As be-
fore, the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
As a last check, we analyse gender gaps for a subgroup of the population, where in-
come is comparable for women and men: the married respondents. Again, the largest
gender gaps discovered earlier prevail.
While we focus on the voters in the main analysis, it would be interesting to know
whether the gender gaps are also present for the non-voters. Unfortunately, non-voters
are asked how they would have voted only in the earlier votes (before 2000). A compari-
son of women’s and men’s approval for these early votes – separately for voters and
non-voters – shows that gender gaps in the policy areas environment, nuclear energy,
healthy lifestyle, gen-technology and the military exist for both subgroups (see Appendix
Table A4). One important difference between voters and non-voters concerns the policy
area ‘equal rights for women and men’: there, large gender differences are found in the
voting population, but not in the non-voting population. Plausibly, turnout among citi-
zens with more extreme preferences in this area must have been higher.
5. THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF WOMEN AS POLICY-MAKERS
So far, we analysed gender gaps in approval rates for proposed policies independently of
their fiscal consequences. Suppose, however, that women are fiscally more conservative
than men. Then, they may not favour costly projects for environmental protection even
though they may care more about it than men.7
7 We could have added a category culture, but the votes are the same as the ones already analysed in
Table 3.
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We next analyse whether women and men differ in how they like to allocate
government resources. To analyse the fiscal preferences of men and women, we select
a subset of ballots that would have unambiguously increased or decreased
government spending.
In order to assess the fiscal impact of each proposition, we use the official documents
prepared by the government which outline the estimated financial consequences, i.e.
whether and by how much spending would increase if the proposition was approved by
the electorate. After careful study, we identified 71 (of the 202) propositions between
1981 and 2003 where the documents showed unambiguous financial consequences.
Appendix Table A5 contains a detailed list of these votes. Note that the set of proposi-
tions we analyse contains both ballots that were approved and therefore affected actual
government spending as well as ballots that were not approved. As a consequence, we
have a representative set of actual political decisions and their financial consequences,
which is not affected by the ballot’s actual success.
The model we estimate is the same as in the last section except that we now use only
the subset of votes with predictable financial consequences. Our dependent variable is
whether a voter supports a ballot that would increase government spending if approved.
If the ballot proposed a reduction of spending, taxes, subsidies or debt, we rescaled the
voting choice as one if the respondent voted against the ballot and zero if the voter ap-
proved a reduction in government spending in that area.
Table 5 displays the results for overall government spending as well as spending in
seven different policy areas (education, health, welfare, environment and nuclear policy,
defence spending, transportation and agricultural policy). The first column shows that
women are 2.5 percentage points more likely to support projects that would increase
overall government spending. They are also 3.1 percentage points less likely to support
a reduction of government debt though the coefficient is not significantly different from
zero. Therefore, men and women do not differ much overall in their support for costly
projects.
However, the picture is different if we look at individual policy areas. Here, we find
that women are 10 percentage points more likely to favour spending for environmental
protection. At the same time, they are also 6 percentage points less likely to support agri-
cultural or military spending. In addition, they are also more supportive of health and
welfare spending than men. As such, women and men have very different preferences
for the composition of government spending.
An interesting exercise would be to compare our estimates with results obtained from
the most similar survey using hypothetical questions.
As it turns out, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) wave six (‘Role of
Government’, 1996) asks the following question, which is in the spirit of our last analysis
on government spending: ‘There are various areas of government spending. Please tell
me for each of them whether you would like to see more or less government spending in
each area. Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to
pay for it.’ Surveyed subjects are all older than 18 years, which correspond precisely to
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the surveyed individuals in the VOX-samples. We match the following policy areas: the
environment, health, education, the military and defence and unemployment benefits.
We then run regressions using as dependent variable an indicator equal to one if a per-
son says: much more or more spending; the variable is zero otherwise. As independent
variables, we include the gender dummy and the same control variables we use in our
analysis of the ballot data.
Table 6 reveals few gender gaps in the ISSP survey; apart from the policy areas
defence and health, the sizes of the estimated coefficients are small (note e.g. the stark
contrast to the VOX results on environmental spending). As such, hypothetical survey
questions may not be well suited to identify gender gaps in policy preferences, either be-
cause survey respondents have little incentives to think seriously about the subject, or be-
cause the survey questions remain too vague on how the additional spending would be
actually financed.
Given that we do not find large gender gaps for total spending, can we conclude that
women are then only marginally more inclined to accept costly projects than men?
Since Lott and Kenny’s (1999) influential article on women suffrage and the size of gov-
ernment, there has been a vivid debate on whether political involvement of women in-
creases government spending or not. Other evidence suggests, in contrast, that women
are more in favour of a balanced budget than men (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; see
also Krogstrup and Wa¨lti, 2011).
Our data allow us to analyse directly whether women, at the ballot box, say more fre-
quently yes than men to projects that increase government spending.8 As mentioned
Table 6. Support for higher expenditures in the ISSP survey
Scope of government
More
environment
More
defence
More
education
More
health
More
redistribution
Female dummy 0.0047 0.0406** 0.0139 0.0516 0.0202
(0.0476) (0.0181) (0.0432) (0.0478) (0.0404)
Region ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 484 485 484 485 483
Log-likelihood 313.2 84.8 290.5 310.5 267.1
Notes: The sample consists of survey respondents who indicate to have voted in the last federal election. The table
reports the marginal effects from a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether the respondent supports more government spending in the speciﬁc policy area (1 if yes, 0 if not). The ta-
ble reports the coefﬁcient on the female dummy variable in each column. The controls are dummy variables for
marital and employment status, religion (1 if protestant, 0 otherwise), age and a dummy for living in an urban
area as well as controls for 7 NUTS2-regions in Switzerland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Wave 6 (‘Role of Government’).
8 It is possible, however, that women might have influence on spending through at least two other chan-
nels: first, the composition of the parliament by electing different representatives or different parties.
Second, women can also affect policies directly by proposing initiatives that support their policies.
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before, the gender gap in approval of costly projects at the ballot box is a mere 2.5 per-
centage point. Note further that actual spending is only affected by women’s political
participation if the proposition is approved by the voters and women changed the final
outcome, i.e. they proved to be pivotal. Among all federal ballots between 1981 and
2003, women and men had approved different outcomes in 15 votes (see Table 7).
Women changed the result in their favour in only four cases or about 2% of the 202
propositions over that period. From these four pivotal votes, only two had clear-cut fiscal
implications.
Based on the information provided by the federal government before the vote, we
can get a rough estimate of the consequences of these two fiscally relevant votes.
Women’s opposition to a reduction in unemployment benefits increased federal spend-
ing by about 70 million Swiss Francs per year. Women, however, were also in favour of
abolishing subsidies for parking spaces, which saved the federal government about 20
million Swiss Francs per year. Relative to the 46 billion federal expenditures in 1999,
the change in voting outcomes by women adds up to a mere 0.1% increase in federal
spending.
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This paper identifies gender gaps in policy preferences as revealed at the ballot box. We
focus on Switzerland, where citizens regularly decide on all relevant issues due to exten-
sive direct democratic rights. We find strong evidence that women and men support a
different allocation of government resources. In particular, we show that female voters
Table 7. Propositions where men and women had accepted different outcomes
Title of proposition Year of
vote
Women
Yes
Men
Yes
Outcome
Ecological and modern agriculture 1995 44.4 50.2 No
Easier access to Swiss real estate for non-residents 1995 43.3 55.4 No
Abolish subsidies for parking spaces at train stations 1996 51.8 41.2 Yes
For a sustainable unemployment insurance 1997 38.9 52.1 No
New regulation fuel tariffs 1983 48.1 57.0 Yes
Introduction of civil service 1984 51.8 44.6 No
Reduce property sales, especially to non-residents 1984 50.9 48.4 No
Stop construction of nuclear power plants 1984 53.9 47.7 No
Stop use of nuclear energy 1990 58.0 43.3 No
Reducing animal testing 1992 55.4 41.7 No
For an ecological military 1993 51.3 42.9 No
Against ﬁghter planes 1993 52.1 43.4 No
Flexible retirement age 62 years for men and women 2000 50.4 43.6 No
For equal rights of the disabled 2003 55.1 40.5 No
Stop construction of nuclear power plants 2003 50.4 44.0 No
Notes: The third and fourth columns show the percentage of women and men voting in favour of the proposition
respectively. The last column shows the ofﬁcial outcome of the federal proposition. The ﬁrst four rows show the
votes where women changed the result. The other rows report the votes, in which men were decisive.
Source: VOX Surveys, 1981–2003.
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care more about the environment, public health, social welfare and are more sceptical
towards nuclear energy or the military. If we focus on the fiscal consequences of women
expressing their preferences in ballots, we find that gender gaps in approval of costly
projects are quite large in specific policy areas (10 percentage point difference in ap-
proval of environmental projects), but comparatively small (2.5 percentage points) when
it comes to the overall size of government.
While these data allow us to uncover genuine gender differences in preferences, the
magnitudes of these gender gaps may not one-to-one carry over to a context of represen-
tative democracies, where women and men act as legislators. To take an extreme exam-
ple, the canonical model of the median voter would predict that candidates implement
the preferences of the median voter irrespective of their gender. It is only the more recent
research that stresses a role for legislators’ identity in policy making (e.g. Washington,
2008), and here, a legislator’s gender may matter. This result then raises the issue on how
many female legislators are needed to get an adequate representation of women’s prefer-
ences. Traditionally, the number of female legislators has been low; as mentioned in the
introduction, only one out of five representatives in national parliaments is a woman.
Would this call for legal intervention in the form of a gender quota? If a low share
offemale legislators reflects voter preferences (e.g. a preference for male legislators) orif-
women have a high disutility from running as candidates, it is not obvious why a gender
quota is needed. Yet, latest research on the reasons for the low share of femalelegisla-
tors in Spain reaches a very different conclusion. The study finds that womenare willing
to run as candidates; furthermore, voters are no more likely to prefer male over female
legislators. The empirical evidence suggests instead that male party members discrimi-
nate against women by either not putting them on the lists, or by putting them in disad-
vantaged positions on those lists–even if this is suboptimal for the party’s electoral
outcome (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2014). If such discriminatory practices by male party
members also prevail in other countries and settings, a well-designed gender quota
could improve the representation of women’s preferences in the political arena.
Discussion
Chiara Fumagalli
Universita` Bocconi
Assessing whether men and women have different preferences for policies is undoubt-
edly an interesting topic. The value added of this paper is that differences in preferences
are measured over a wide range of policies and by using actual decisions that have real
consequences rather than answers to vague questions concerning hypothetical situations.
The paper shows in a convincing way that a difference exists on specific policies: women
care more about the environment, public health and social welfare while they are more
skeptical towards nuclear energy and military expenditures.
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However, having different preferences does not automatically translate into the fact
that men and women in power would choose different policies. Men and women elected
as representatives might choose similar policies – despite differences in preferences –
because they respond to their electorate and are constrained by the programme of the
party they belong to. In this respect, women’s preferences do not need female represen-
tatives to be voiced. Moreover, men and women elected as representatives might choose
similar policies because they are constrained by the specific circumstances in which their
choices materialize. For instance, women may be in favour of increasing expenditures in
social welfare, but in a country with a high and increasing public debt such policies may
be simply unfeasible. Finally, the preferences of women who are elected in parliament
or who become members of a government are likely to be quite different from the pref-
erences of the population of female voters. In sum, the paper does not show and does
not argue in a convincing way why the existence of differences in preferences justifies
policy intervention to facilitate women’s participation in the political life.
At the same time, the existence of differences in preferences is not even necessary for such
a policy intervention. The primary reason why women’s participation in the political life
should be facilitated is to guarantee equal opportunities and to avoid that prejudices
regarding women’s capabilities and leadership may result in discrimination within politi-
cal organizations and exclusion from the political arena. Moreover, a more intense
women’s participation would also make the selection process of politicians more compet-
itive and more efficient, thereby benefitting society also through this channel. These
arguments do not need the existence of differences in preferences to be put forward.
For the above reasons, I believe that the value of this paper lies in the new and inter-
esting questions that it stimulates rather than in the policy implications that can be drawn
from the paper’s results. What is the origin of the differences in preferences that the
paper documents? Is it the fact that in Switzerland women were denied the right to vote
until 1971? Do the documented differences decrease overtime, as women gain familiarity
with voting? The paper shows that differences in preferences between men and women
exist even if one controls for income, working status, education, etc. However, it would
be interesting to understand whether such differences exist even if one controls for the
type of education and the type of occupation. Do men and women having a scientific
degree exhibit differences in preferences? Do men and women acting as top managers in
large companies exhibit different preferences? To what extent are the differences that we
observe the result of the different way men and women are grown up and trained, or of
the different activities they develop in their life? The paper cannot explore these ques-
tions for data limitations but it would be worth exploring them in future research.
Josep Pijoan-Mas
CEMFI
The article by Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann investigates whether men and
women differ in political preferences. To do so, they look at policy ballots by the Swiss
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Federal Government. In particular, they use survey data – collected shortly after the
referenda took place – that ask about the vote, as well as about some socio-economic
information of the respondent. In contrast, the standard approach to explore gender dif-
ferences in political preferences is based on hypothetical questions. The data used in this
article are more interesting because they reflect actual choices, which means that people
were well informed about the policies and their consequences. For this reason, I think
this article adds a very important piece of evidence to the literature.
The results are aligned with the idea that women are more progressive than men:
women tend to be more in favour of foreign immigration, environment protection,
more culture and less military spending, as well as issues related to women rights. The
results show a much larger importance of the gender bias in terms of composition of
public spending than in the size of the government budget. Finally, the article concludes
by arguing that these gender differences hint at the idea that gender quotas in politics
may be desirable to ensure the correct representation of women preferences in policy
making.
In what follows I would like to discuss briefly on three issues: the representativeness of
the sample of survey respondents, the estimation of the gender effect and the policy
implications.
Sample representativeness
In order to extrapolate the results of the paper to the Swiss population, we would like to
be sure that the VOX sample is representative of the overall Swiss population. There
are two ways to look into this: first, by comparing the observable characteristics of the
individuals in the sample (by gender) to the ones in the overall population. Second, by
checking whether the actual election results coincide with the ones measured in the
survey.
Regarding the observable characteristics of individuals in the sample, Table 1
presents a comparison by gender to the overall Swiss population. My reading of this
table is that the VOX sample is not truly representative of the overall Swiss population,
and that the problem is more severe for women. In particular, women in the VOX sam-
ple are younger, less educated, more likely to be employed and more likely to be mar-
ried than women in the overall population. Men are also less educated and more likely
to be married, but to a lesser degree. These differences are not dramatic and, to the
extent that all these demographic characteristics are included in the regressions, we
should not be too worried about them. However, these differences reflect some problems
with the sampling or with the response rates of the survey, which might generate differ-
ences in relevant unobserved characteristics of individuals.
Regarding the election results in the sample, the authors show that they align well
with some of the ballots, but they do not with some others. Looking at Appendix
Table 1, we see that the average (absolute value) difference among the ballots used for
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the study is 6.8%, with differences ranging from only 0.8% at the lowest 10th percentile
to 14.6% at the 90th percentile. These differences may be problematic. If they are just
the result of the differences in observable individual characteristics mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph, then we should not be too worried about them given the controls in
the regressions. However, there are reasons to worry if these differences reflect either dif-
ferences in unobserved individual characteristics or biases in responses about the vote.
The authors perform a very informative exercise to discard the second reason for con-
cern: they focus on ballots for which response biases are likely to be lower (those ballots
referred to questions that do not have a clear politically correct view), and they find gen-
der biases in this subsample that are comparable to the ones found on the whole sample.
This is very good news. Perhaps, a final robustness exercise to wipe out all potential con-
cerns would be to work also with the subsample of ballots for which the survey results
coincide with the actual election.
Identification of the gender coefficient
In their regressions, the authors add several controls to capture potential demographic
or socio-economic differences between men and women: age, education, labour market
status, home ownership, religion and canton. Therefore, the gender coefficients can be
interpreted as differences between men and women that are not related to their differ-
ence in socio-economic status. A potential concern would be how well the differences in
socio-economic status are captured. In particular, for most of the regressions there is
no information about income, while house ownership is a very coarse measure of
socio-economic status. Yet, the authors get around this problem quite nicely by showing
that for the subset of ballots where income is available, the gender coefficients hardly
change. One way to understand this result is that education, which is present in all
regressions, is a better measure of socio-economic status than the income flow in a given
period. This is consistent with the evidence that the socio-economic gradient of longevity
is much stronger in education than in income or wealth, see for instance Pijoan-Mas
and Rı´os-Rull (2014).
Policy implications
The article hints at the idea that the existence of a gender bias in political preferences
may be an argument for establishing gender quotas in politics. The argument runs
somewhat like this: ‘to guarantee that individual preferences are correctly aggregated
into policy making, as long as women and men have different political preferences, it
would be good to achieve gender equality in politics.’ I am worried about this interpre-
tation: does it mean that we do not believe in representative democracy any more? Do
females in office legislate differently than men? As the authors argue in the article, in the
end this is an empirical matter. The existing evidence is mixed. Women and men seem
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to legislate differently in developing economies (see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) or
Clots-Figueras (2012)). However, in developed economies there is very little evidence of
a gender gap in policy making: Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and Gagliarducci and
Paserman (2012) find no effect for American and Italian mayors. Furthermore, there
are strong reasons to think that gender gaps in political preferences do not translate into
policy making: from the median-voter theorem, to the evidence that men love women –
or at least their daughters (see Warner (1991), Warner and Steel (1999), and
Washington (2008)). Finally, to put this argument in perspective, the results in the paper
show even larger gaps in political preferences according to age. Shall we conclude that
we need age quotas in policy making? I do not think so.
To sum up, the results in this paper should not be taken as an argument in favour of
gender quotas in politics. Does this mean that gender quotas in politics are not neces-
sary? No, it just means that if they are necessary it is for different reasons. My take is
that gender quotas in politics are necessary in order to change the type of attitudes in
society that prevent women from occupying better jobs. For instance, the World still
thinks that women are less capable political leaders than men. In particular, the World
Value Survey 2005–2009 presents the following statement to the interviewees: In general,
men are better political leaders than women, and people are asked to decide whether they
strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree. In Table 8 I report, for a selection
Table 8. People who think that men are better political
leaders than women
Country Agree Gender bias
Sweden 0.08 (0.000) þ0.017 (0.858)
Norway 0.14 (0.000) 0.018 (0.418)
Canada 0.15 (0.000) 0.054 (0.001)
Switzerland 0.15 (0.000) þ0.028 (0.159)
Netherlands 0.17 (0.000) 0.049 (0.033)
Germany 0.18 (0.000) 0.131 (0.000)
Britain 0.18 (0.000) 0.097 (0.000)
Italy 0.18 (0.000) 0.126 (0.000)
Spain 0.20 (0.000) 0.079 (0.001)
France 0.21 (0.000) 0.052 (0.045)
USA 0.26 (0.000) 0.081 (0.001)
Mexico 0.27 (0.000) 0.098 (0.002)
Japan 0.30 (0.000) 0.092 (0.002)
Brazil 0.31 (0.000) 0.142 (0.000)
Cyprus 0.36 (0.000) 0.203 (0.000)
Thailand 0.51 (0.000) 0.108 (0.000)
India 0.53 (0.000) 0.204 (0.000)
Turkey 0.58 (0.000) 0.148 (0.000)
Egypt 0.92 (0.000) 0.052 (0.000)
Data: World Values Survey 2005–2009. The ﬁrst column reports the fraction of
people who endorse the statement In general, men are better political leaders than women.
The second column reports the difference between men and women, controlling
for age and education. A minus sign means that women agree less with the state-
ment. For both columns, in parenthesis, p-value of the Null to the corresponding
coefﬁcient is zero.
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of countries, the proportion of people that either agree or strongly agree with the state-
ment. What we find is that this proportion is statistically different from zero in ALL
countries, even in Sweden – the country with the smallest proportion of people subscrib-
ing to the statement – where 8% of people agree or strongly agree. There is also a large
heterogeneity across countries, with European countries ranging from 15% to 20% of
people endorsing the statement, and several countries scoring 50% or more.
An interesting feature is that one can also look at the gender bias on this question. I
have regressed the dummy variable that takes one if the respondent agrees or strongly
agrees with the statement, against education, age, and a gender dummy, which takes
one for females. In Table 8, I report the gender bias measured with the coefficient of the
gender dummy. What we observe is that women agree less with the statement, the sign
being negative in all countries where it is statistically different from zero. Interestingly,
there seems to be no gender bias in Switzerland.
Panel discussion
Lutz Kilian was concerned about the interpretation of the gender effects. He gave an
example on smoking regulations: if women are less likely to smoke than men, then
women are more likely to vote for smoking regulation, but this expresses different prefer-
ences of smokers and non-smokers, not of men and women. He suggested putting an
additional control for the fraction of smokers in the female population, and similarly for
other cases, e.g. fraction of men and women with military service. Michalis Haliassos
asked whether more information could be included in terms of how specific policy issues
end up in a referendum. Who decides on the inclusion in a referendum, how long is the
discussion process beforehand, and how informed are the individual respondents about
the issues at hand? He also wondered whether voting at the poll is a good predictor of
decisions when in power, since policy-makers face many more constraints than voters.
Martin Ellison was skeptical about surveys on peoples’ opinions in general. He was not
necessarily convinced by the aggregate consistency between survey responses and actual
referendum results, since it could still be the case that men are more likely to report
more masculine positions and women are more likely to report more feminine positions.
Banu Demir mentioned existing evidence that women are more risk averse than men.
This could potentially explain the gender bias for speed limits or related issues. She sug-
gested restricting the issues to those for which aggregate data can be found to control for
biases. Martin Brown raised the point that there might be other patterns in the voting
data than the gender pattern, e.g. cohort patterns or different voting behaviour of
naturalized foreigners. Therefore, it would be an interesting exercise to see how the
magnitude of the gender effect compares to the magnitude of cohort effects or country
of origin effects. Sascha Becker raised the issue of heterogeneity and wondered whether
there existed differences across the French, Italian and German speaking parts of
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Switzerland. Moreover, Swiss cantons introduced women’s suffrage at different points in
time: is there any pattern relating to this in the data? He also asked whether the authors
interact the female effect with other explanatory variables, e.g. gender. Replying to the
comments, Patricia Funk said that they would not like to control for smoking since the
choice of smoking is endogenous. Moreover, for some possible controls the data simply
do not exist. On the issue of how well-informed people are, she stressed that in
Switzerland political discussion is very widespread, so that most people are well
informed and aware of the consequences of their votes. On the survey biases, she consid-
ered it very unlikely that they would exactly cancel each other out for men and women.
She agreed that accounting for heterogeneous treatment effects is a valuable exercise.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF THE VOTESWITH THE LARGESTGENDERGAPS
(1) Reduction Tobacco Consumption (Initiative)
Vote held 28 November 1993; Vote Nr. 404; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes: 25.5%
Goal Initiative: To prohibit advertisement for tobacco. To use 1% of the reve-
nues from taxing tobacco to educate about the health consequences of tobacco
consumption.
(2) Equal Representation of Women in Federal Government (Initiative)
Vote held 12 March 2000; Vote Nr. 461; Turnout: 42.2%; Share-Yes: 18%
Goal Initiative: Adjust the stuffing policy of the federal government to guarantee
equal chances for men and women. No direct financial consequences indicated.
(3) Change in Marital Law (Referendum)
Vote held 22 September 1985; Vote Nr. 336; Turnout: 41.1%; Share-Yes: 54.7%
Goal Law: Change the marital law to explicitly state that husbands and wives
have equal rights and obligations. Housework and childcare are considered as a
fulltime contribution to the family maintenance.
No financial consequences indicated.
(4) Against Racial Discrimination (Referendum)
Vote held 25 September 1994; Vote Nr. 414; Turnout: 45.9%; Share-Yes:
54.6%
Goal Law: Change of the Law (Civil law and Military law) to prosecute persons
who engage actively in promoting discrimination based on race, ethnicity or reli-
gion. No financial consequences indicated.
(5) Against Subsidies for Corn Production (Referendum)
Vote held 25 September 1994; Vote Nr. 413; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes:
64.6%
GENDER GAPS IN POLICY MAKING 169
Table A1. Votes, gender gaps and survey accuracy
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
1993 Initiative for Reducing Problems with
Tobacco
404 17.71 0.65 PRO HEALTH
2000 Initiative for a fair Representation of
Women in the Government
461 17.49 0.53 EQUAL
1985 Marriage and Inheritance Law 336 17.04 0.00 EQUAL
1994 Swiss Criminal Code on Military
Law
414 16.86 0.05
1994 Against Subsidies for Corn
Production
413 15.58 0.98 AGRI SUB
1993 Initiative for Reducing Problems with
Alcohol
403 15.55 0.47 PRO HEALTH
1992 Initiative for Saving the Waters 381 15.26 0.46 ENV
2003 For a car-free Sunday per Quarter 498 14.92 0.22 ENV
1990 Initiative against Nuclear Energy 365 14.72 0.19 CONTRA NUC
2003 Initiative Equal Rights for Disables 500 14.62 0.00 PRO DISABLED
1981 Equal Rights for Women and Men 306 14.55 0.00 EQUAL
1987 For Protection of the Swiss Moors 349 14.23 0.00 ENV
1992 Initiative for Restricting Animal
Testing
374 13.65 0.04 CONTRA GEN
1997 Federal Resolution on Financing the
Unemployment Insurance
437 13.23 0.13 UNEMPL
1990 Initiative against Nuclear Power
Plants
366 13.20 0.00 CONTRA NUC
1999 Initiative Proprietary for Everybody 451 13.19 0.99
1986 For joining the United Nations
Organizations
338 12.22 0.06 INT
1995 Law on Acquisition of Property
through Foreigners
424 12.05 0.26
2003 Federal Resolution on Changes of
Citizens’ Rights
493 11.66 0.06 DD
1985 Against the Use of Animals for
Scientiﬁc Purposes
337 11.49 0.04
1987 Law on Health Insurance 350 11.11 0.01 PROMOTHER
1994 Federal Resolution on the Promotion
of Culture
410 10.92 0.00 MORE CULT
1998 Initiative for Protection against Gen-
Manipulation
440 10.91 0.80 CONTRA GEN
2000 Initiative for Restricting Immigration 467 10.86 0.00 LESS FOR
1985 For a Coordinated Start of Schools 334 10.74 0.01
1998 Initiative 10th Revision Age
Insurance without increasing the
Retirement Age
444 10.69 0.51 CONTRA RET
1989.5 For higher Speed Limits 130/100 358 10.57 0.00 PRO SPEED
1996 Against Federal Subsidies for Parking
Spaces
429 10.54 0.01 SUB PARKING
2002 Law on the Electricity Market 490 10.51 0.00
1991 Initiative for Promoting Public
Transportation
370 10.36 0.12 PUB TRANS
1996 Federal Resolution on the Revision
of the Language Article
425 10.29 0.10
1992 Law on Protection of the Waters 377 9.55 0.00 ENV
1994 For easier Naturalization of
Immigrants
411 9.47 0.00 PRO FOR
1991 Federal Resolution on the
Coordination on Trafﬁc Policy
371 9.43 0.45
2001 Initiative for Low Pharmaceutical
Prices
475 9.37 0.00 CHEAP PHARMA
(Continued)
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Table A1. (continued)
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
1993 Federal Resolution on the Union of
the community Laufen with the
Canton BS
395 9.36 0.00
1985 Abolish Charges for Primary School 326 9.18 0.55
1996 Initiative against Illegal Immigration 432 9.02 0.00
1987 Initiative for Direct Democracy in
Military Expenses
346 9.00 0.27
1983 Regulation of Custom’s Duty of Fuel 312 8.92 0.85
2000 Initiative Saving in the Military 471 8.91 0.59 LESS MILITARY
1992 Law on Stamp Duties 384 8.88 0.12
1993 Initiative For a Switzerland without
new Fighter Jets
393 8.76 0.02 LESS MILITARY
1992 Initiative for a cheap Health
Insurance
373 8.75 0.33 SUB HEALTH-INS.
1993 Pro Environmental Protection in the
Army
392 8.37 0.32
1994 Law on mandatory measures in
Immigration Law
417 8.19 0.85
1993 Federal Resolution on Misuse of
Arms
394 8.14 0.00
1985 Right to Live 330 7.78 0.01
1993 Initiative against Animal
Experiments
391 7.57 0.23 CONTRA GEN
1994 Law on the Health Insurance 415 7.54 0.00
1990 Federal Resolution on Building Vines 363 7.50 0.01
1987 Law on Residence of Foreigners 345 7.35 0.41
1990 Initiative for Restricting Road
Making
359 7.18 0.51 LESS ROAD
1984 Civil Service 318 7.14 0.00
1992 Federal Resolution on Building the
Swiss Railway
382 7.01 0.10 PUB TRANS
1994 Initiative for Protection of the Alps 408 6.98 0.09 ENV
2000 Initiative against Manipulations in
the Technology of Reproduction
462 6.89 0.64
1985 Venture Capital for Small and
Middle-Sized Enterprises
335 6.89 0.93
2000 Initiative for a ﬂexible Retirement
Age
470 6.87 0.73 CONTRA RET
1998 Federal Law regulating working
conditions
448 6.85 0.46
1986 For secured Education 340 6.83 0.00 EDU
1998 Law on user-dependent heavy Trafﬁc
Charge
442 6.67 0.02
1993 Initiative ‘For a Federal Holiday on
August 1’
396 6.45 0.03 MORE LEIS
1997 Initiative Against Exporting Arms 435 6.42 0.05
2002 Law Regulating Abortion 487 6.41 0.81 ABORTION
2003 Initiative For Restricting Nuclear
Risks
502 6.38 0.01 CONTRA NUC
2000 Initiative for a ﬂexible Age Insurance 469 6.33 0.04 CONTRA RET
1998 Initiative S.o.S.–Schweiz ohne
Schnu¨ffelpolizei
441 6.31 0.06
2000 Initiative for cutting motorized Road
Trafﬁc into Half
463 6.29 0.78 ENV
1984 Nuclear Power Plants 321 6.21 0.10 CONTRA NUC
2000 Initiative More rights for the people 468 6.03 0.19 DD
1992 Law on Business Transactions 383 5.86 0.00
1992 Salaries Parliamentary Members 386 5.86 0.00
(Continued)
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Table A1. (continued)
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
1992 Compensations Parliamentary
Members
387 5.86 0.06
1985 Abolish Cantonal Share on Stamp
Duties
331 5.85 0.00
2002 Initiative Protection of Mother and
Baby
488 5.79 0.60
1995 Counterproposal to the Initiative for
an ecological and effective
agriculture
418 5.73 0.54 AGRI LIB
2001 Federal Resolution promoting a Debt
Break
480 5.71 0.51 LESS DEBT
1981 For Protecting Consumers’ Rights 307 5.66 0.00
1985 Regulating Contributions for
Education
328 5.63 0.01
1995 Initiative for better Age Insurance 423 5.60 0.85 CONTRA RET
2001 Federal Resolution on Abolishing
Permissions to build Dioceses
479 5.54 0.00
2003 Federal Law on the Military 495 5.44 0.02 LESS MILITARY
1996 Counterproposal to the Initiative for
a natural agriculture
430 5.38 0.82
1998 Initiative for cheap aliments and eco-
logical agriculture
443 5.24 0.20
2003 Initiative Against Nuclear Power
Plants
501 5.16 0.17 CONTRA NUC
1987 Train 2000 348 5.13 0.00
1985 For Longer Paid Vacations 329 5.10 0.08 MORE LEIS
1996 Federal Resolution on the Cantonal
Authority on Personal Military
Equipment
427 5.05 0.00
2003 Federal Law on Civil Protection 496 4.89 0.92
1990 For Free Aare-Region 362 4.83 0.32 LESS ROAD
1999 Law on the Insurance of Disabled 457 4.77 0.00
1987 Asylum Law 344 4.76 0.27
2003 Federal Law on Cantonal
Contributions to Treatments in
Hospitals
494 4.75 0.09
1992 Federal Resolution for a Civilian
Service for Military Deniars
379 4.73 0.00
1984 Against the Abuse of the Banking
Secrecy
319 4.69 0.80
2000 For a Pigouvian Tax on Energy 466 4.67 0.00 ENV
1994 Federal Resolution on Charges on
National Strees
405 4.64 0.00
1999 Asylum Law 454 4.64 0.83
1992 Swiss Military Code 380 4.63 0.00
1997 Initiative ‘Youth Without Drugs’ 438 4.57 0.48
1981 For improving the Federal Finances 308 4.56 0.00 LESS DEBT
1999 Federal Resolution on Medical
Prescription for Heroine
456 4.54 0.41 DRUG
1991 For Reducing the Voting Age from
21 to 18
369 4.45 0.00 DD
1983 Energy Article 313 4.45 0.01
1995 Law on Age Insurance 422 4.35 0.99 PRO RET AGE
2002 Initiative for Lower Working Hours 486 4.33 0.00 MORE LEIS
1994 Initiative for a healthy Health
Insurance
416 4.28 0.02 SUB HEALTH-INS.
2000 Federal Law on the Employees of the
Government
473 4.23 0.02
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Table A1. (continued)
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
1993 Measures on Unemployment
Insurance
398 4.15 0.00 UNEMPL
1988 Initiative against Speculation with
Properties
353 4.15 0.64
2002 Initiative against Misuse in Asylum
Matters
491 4.05 0.00 LESS FOR
1993 Federal Resolution on Gambling
Houses
390 3.99 0.34
2001 Initiative for a better security on the
strees with speed limit 30
476 3.99 0.39 SAFE STREET
1984 Taxation of Heavy Trafﬁc 316 3.89 0.54
1990 Initiative against Freeway between
Murten and Yverdon
360 3.71 0.09 LESS ROAD
1988 For Restricting Immigration 355 3.70 0.00 LESS FOR
1986 Culture Initiative 339 3.67 0.66 MORE CULT
2003 Initiative for sufﬁcient Occupational
Training
503 3.64 0.00
2001 Initiative For a voluntary civil service 483 3.63 0.13
1996 Law on the Organization of the
Executive and Administration
431 3.47 0.41
1994 Federal Resolution on Trafﬁc Road
Charges
406 3.41 0.98
1994 Federal Resolution on usage-depend-
ent Trafﬁc Road Charges
407 3.40 0.22
1992 Against Misuse in Gene-Technology 378 3.35 0.57 CONTRA GEN
1994 Law on Military forces with Peaceful
Missions
412 3.34 0.01
2001 Initiative for Taxation of Capital
Gains
484 3.28 0.90
1990 Initiative against Freeway in the
Knonauer Amt
361 3.27 0.24 LESS ROAD
2001 Federal Law on the Army 477 3.25 0.05
1993 Federal Resolution on Federal
Finances
399 3.16 0.40
1987 Law on Procedures on Initiatives
with Alternative Drafts
347 3.08 0.00
1999 Law on the Insurance of Mothers 458 3.07 0.08 PROMOTHER
1989 Initiative for a Switzerland without
Army
357 3.07 0.41 LESS MILITARY
1985 New Distribution Revenues Alcohol 332 3.05 0.02
2002 Federal Law on the Unemployment
Insurance
492 2.94 0.29
1995 Law on Reducing Federal Expenses 421 2.68 0.74 LESS DEBT
1982 Against abusive Prices 311 2.65 1.00
2001 Initiative for a secure Age Insurance 481 2.62 0.18 ENV
1998 Federal Resolution on a new Corn
Article
446 2.55 0.11 AGRI LIB
1984 Against the Sale of Homeland 320 2.48 0.83
1992 Federal Resolution on the European
Economic Area
388 2.40 0.34 INT
1984 Radio and TV-Article 324 2.31 0.00
2003 Initiative For reasonable Health
Costs
499 2.21 0.80
1993 Measures for Protecting the Social
Insurances
401 2.21 0.08
2000 Federal Resolution on Bilateral
Agreements between Switzerland
and the EU
464 2.15 0.00 INT
1990 Law on the organization of the fed-
eral judicature
364 2.15 0.00
(Continued)
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Table A1. (continued)
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
1999 Federal Resolution on a new Federal
Constitution
453 2.15 0.00
1999 Federal Resolution on Regulating
Transplantation Medicine
450 2.13 0.11
2000 Solar Initiative 465 2.09 0.17 ENV
1985 Abolishing Contributions for Corn
with the Purpose of Self-
Sufﬁciency
333 2.07 0.08 AGRI SUB
1985 Abolish Federal Duty to Pay for
Health
327 2.07 0.63
1999 Federal Resolution on the Eligibility
in the Federal Council
449 2.04 0.08
1995 Resolution on Dairy Farming 419 1.95 0.74 AGRI LIB
1990 Federal Resolution on the Energy
Article
367 1.94 0.72
1999 Federal Resolution on Urgent
Matters in the Area of Asylum
455 1.88 0.86
1996 Against the Federal Duty to buy
Spirits
428 1.75 0.95
1997 Against Federal Regulations on Gun
Powder
436 1.70 0.11
1993 Federal Resolution against further
Increases in Health Insurance
Premias
397 1.59 0.00
2001 Initiative for a Switzerland without
Army
482 1.49 0.14 LESS MILITARY
1993 Law on Customs on Fuel 389 1.46 0.02
1986 Federal Solution on Domestic Sugar
Industry
341 1.43 0.53
1992 Law on Paysants’ Land Rights 385 1.40 0.00
1999 Federal Law on City and Regional
Planning
452 1.25 0.01
1998 Federal Resolution on Funds for the
Infrastructure on Public Trafﬁc
445 1.22 0.00 PUB TRANS
1993 Federal Resolution for Healthy
Federal Finances
400 1.14 0.02 LESS DEBT
1994 Law on Aviation 409 1.05 0.00
2002 Initiative ‘Excessive Gold Reserves
for the Age Insurance’
489 1.00 0.01
1997 Initiative Direct Democracy for
Negotiations with the EU
434 0.83 0.10
1998 Federal Resolution on Measures for
Budget Balancing
439 0.82 0.01 LESS DEBT
1996 Federal Resolution on the union of
the community Vellerat with the
Canton JU
426 0.80 0.70
1984 Charges for the Use of National
Roads
317 0.76 0.91
2001 Initiative Yes to Europe! 474 0.71 0.44 INT
2002 Initiative for joining the United
Nations
485 0.68 0.00 INT
2000 Initiative for faster Direct Democracy 460 0.66 0.00 DD
1984 On the Compensation of Criminal
Victims
325 0.61 0.00
1988 Initiative for Shorter Working Hours 354 0.56 0.08 MORE LEIS
1984 Protection of Motherhood 323 0.39 0.00 PROMOTHER
2003 Initiative Yes to Fair Rental Prices 497 0.39 0.19 CHEAP RENT
2001 Federal Law on the Army
(Cooperation in Education)
478 0.37 0.06
1996 Federal Law regulating working
conditions
433 0.30 0.31
(Continued)
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Goal Federal Resolution: To reduce the subsidies for corn production. Initially,
the government bought corn from the Swiss corn produces at higher (than mar-
ket) prices to maintain a high level of domestic production for situations of crises
like wars. To the mills, the government sold at (cheaper) foreign prices, which
involved substantial costs.
(6) Reduction of Alcohol Consumption (Initiative)
Vote held 28 November 1993; Vote Nr. 403; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes:
25.3%
Goal Initiative: Prohibit Advertisement for Alcohol. Fiscal Consequences:
Higher taxes on alcohol.
(7) Protection of Rivers and Lakes (Initiative)
Vote held 17 May 1992; Vote Nr. 381; Turnout: 39.2%; Share-Yes: 37.1%
Goal Initiative: Protection of rivers and lakes, major objectives are the following:
to protect human beings and animals, to secure the portable water supply, to
protect the living space for flora and fauna, and to secure the water supply for
agricultural purposes.
Financial consequences, as indicated in the election documents: Once the law
comes into effect (1992), the average costs for the government will be around
100 million Swiss Francs per year (170 million Swiss Francs in the beginning, 40
million Swiss Francs after that).
Table A1. (continued)
Year Title of the proposition Vote Nr. Gender gaps P-values Pol. area
2000 Federal Resolution on the Reform of
the Judiciary
459 0.29 0.43
1991 Initiative for Decreasing the
Retirement Age
372 0.26 0.06
1998 Initiative for a reasonable drug policy 447 0.12 0.88 DRUG
2000 For lower Costs of Hospitals 472 0.05 0.00 CHEAP HOSP.
1993 Federal Resolution on Consumption
Taxes
402 0.05 0.15
1995 Law on Farming 420 0.00 0.50 AGRI LIB
Notes: The table reports for all the votes held between 1981 and 2003: the year of the vote, the title of the vote,
the vote number, the gender gap, the P-value of a hypothesis test ‘Approval Survey¼ Approval Ballot-Box’
and the Policy Area (if classiﬁed). Grey votes have been assigned to one of the 30 policy areas studied. ENV:
environmental protection; EQUAL: equal rights for women and men; INT: joining International Organizations;
DD: more direct democracy; AGRI LIB: liberalizing agriculture; AGRI SUB: against subsidies in the
agricultural sector; DRUG: pro liberalizing drugs; PUB TRANS: pro public transport; SUB PARKING:
subsidies parking spaces; PRO HEALTH: against alcohol and tobacco; LESS FOR: pro restricting immigration;
PRO FOR: for facilitating integration of foreigners; MORE CULT: for promoting culture; MORE LEIS:
more leisure; ABORTION: pro legalize abortion; CHEAP HOSP./PHARMA: subsidize in the health
sector; PRO RET AGE: pro increasing the retirement age; SAFE STREET: pro speed limits; CHEAP RENT:
pro cheaper rental prices; PRO SPEED: relax speed limits; CONTRA NUC: against nuclear energy; LESS
MILITARY: against the army; LESS ROAD: against further road construction; UNEMPL: reduce
unemployment beneﬁts; PRO DISABLED: support the disabled; EDU: pro free education; SUB
HEALTH-INS.: subsidies premia for health insurance; CONTRA RET: against increase retirement
age; PRO MOTHER: protection motherhood.
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(8) For a Car-free Sunday per Quarter (Initiative)
Vote held 18 May 2003; Vote Nr. 498; Turnout: 49.8%; Share-Yes: 37.6%
Goal Initiative: For the next four years, there should be one Sunday per season
where private motorized vehicles are only permitted in exceptional circumstan-
ces (e.g. ambulances).
(9) For Abandoning Nuclear Energy (Initiative)
Vote held 23 September 1990; Vote Nr. 365; Turnout: 40.4%; Share-Yes: 47.1%
Goal Initiative: No further implementation of nuclear plants. No major fiscal
implications, potentially an increase in unemployment in the nuclear sector.
(10) For Equal Rights of the Disabled (Initiative)
Vote held 18 May, 2003; Vote Nr. 500; Turnout: 49.7%; Share-Yes: 37.7%
Goal Initiative: Equal rights for disabled people and abolishment of any sort of
existing discrimination. Furthermore, where financially feasible, the entrances of
public buildings and facilities should be made accessible to handicapped people.
Fiscal consequences in case of acceptance: CostTables for reconstruction and
renovation (2–4 million Swiss Francs, 10 million Swiss Francs for the reconstruc-
tion of universities; further costs for other infrastructure possible).
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